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 Abstract 
Implementing large-scale information and communication technology (IT) 
projects carries large risks and easily might disrupt operations, waste taxpayers’ 
money, and create negative publicity. Because of the high risks it is important that 
government leaders manage the attendant risks. We analysed a sample of 1,355 public 
sector IT projects. The sample included large-scale projects, on average the actual 
expenditure was $130 million and the average duration was 35 months.  
Our findings showed that the typical project had no cost overruns and took on 
average 24% longer than initially expected. However, comparing the risk distribution 
with the normative model of a thin-tailed distribution, projects’ actual costs should 
fall within -30% and +25% of the budget in nearly 99 out of 100 projects. The data 
showed, however, that a staggering 18% of all projects are outliers with cost overruns 
>25%. Tests showed that the risk of outliers is even higher for standard software 
(24%) as well as in certain project types, e.g., data management (41%), office 
management (23%), eGovernment (21%) and management information systems 
(20%). Analysis showed also that projects duration adds risk: every additional year of 
project duration increases the average cost risk by 4.2 percentage points.  
Lastly, we suggest four solutions that public sector organization can take: (1) 
benchmark your organization to know where you are, (2) de-bias your IT project 
decision-making, (3) reduce the complexities of your IT projects, and (4) develop 
Masterbuilders to learn from the best in the field. 
 
 
 
“For the past 40 years, for example, we’ve tortured ourselves over our inability to 
finish a software project on time and on budget. But this never should have been the 
supreme goal. The more important goal is transformation, creating software that 
changes the world or that transforms a company or how it does business… Software 
development is and always will be somewhat experimental.”  - DeMarco, 1995i 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Government leaders know that every large IT project carries some level of 
risk. Many high-profile public sector projects have cost too much, taken too long, or 
failed to deliver the promised benefits. The consequences can include disruptions to 
daily operations, financial losses, negative publicity, or all of the above. Because the 
failure of an IT change initiative often has wide-ranging repercussions, government 
leaders—not just chief information officers—are beginning to understand they must 
proactively manage the attendant risks.  
 
In May 1996 the Benefits Agency of the UK Department of Social Security 
and the executives at Post Office Counters Ltd. jointly made a decision. They 
awarded a one billion GBP, seven-year contract that would change how 20,000 post 
offices would work, and how 17 million benefits recipients would receive their money 
(760 million payments every year). However, the decision quickly turned sour - in 
July the first issues were discovered two month before the system development was 
planned to start, by the end of the year the project was re-baselined to allow increase 
the time for system development from seven to twelve months. In the end the project 
was abandoned in May 1999, software development was not finished and the most 
current forecast projected the project to deliver three years behind scheduled go-live, 
30% budget overrun and a total spend of 1 billion pounds. (National Audit Officeii) 
 
This was an eye-catching example of failure. Whenever a large IT system goes 
live the press is rife with stories about it. Yet, the public sector is not alone. Our 
research shows that IT project failure can bring down entire private companies. But 
how risky are IT Projects really? Several attempts have been made to turn the 
anecdotal evidence of cost and schedule overruns and benefits shortfalls in large-scale 
IT projects into surveys that measure risk more systematically.  
 
When, in 1999, the Standish Group first published the now infamous Chaos 
Report their findings seemed to epitomise the perceived IT project crisis. Academic 
research by Jonesiii, who aimed to develop measurements to quantify the scope of IT 
projects reported a plummeting success rate of such projects with increasing size. 
Both studies saw virtually no success for projects larger than 6 million dollars. 
However, academia debunked these findings. Surveys and case studies of IT 
portfolios failed to find signs of an IT project crisis. Many of our colleagues have 
questioned the rigour and criticized the opaque data collection behind the alarmist 
studies. Recently, our colleaguesiv showed that using the Standish Groups definitions 
of ‘successful’, ‘challenged’, and ‘failed projects’ actually harms an organization.  
 
Moreover, none of the prior studies has recognised the special context of the 
public sector (for a survey of studies see our 2011 working paper Double Whammy). 
The research project first tries to answer the question: “How risky are public sector IT 
projects really?”  
 
 
A global stock-take 
 
To help public sector leaders better understand and manage risk in IT projects, 
we have conducted the largest-ever global study of public sector IT change initiatives. 
Our research, covering a sample of 1,355 IT projects was supported by McKinsey & 
Company. Our data came from three sources: Freedom of Information Act requests to 
26 U.S. federal departments, reports from the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
and international equivalents, and project documents from public sector organizations. 
The IT projects in our sample had an average initial budget of $130 million and an 
average duration of 35 months.   
 
Project archaeology 
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Results and analysis 
 
Our research is still ongoing, but our preliminary analysis has already yielded 
two surprising findings. The first is that public sector IT projects, on average, do not 
go over budget at all. This counterintuitive finding makes sense in light of our second 
surprising finding: that the risk distribution of IT projects is full of outliers in very fat 
tails and far from a normal distribution. Most risk-management models assume a 
normal distribution with thin tails—in this case, a “normal” project’s actual costs 
would be within -30 percent and +25 percent of the budget (the light-gray area in 
Exhibit 2), and 99.3 percent of projects would fall within this range, i.e. less than 0.7 
percent of all projects are outliers. Public sector IT, however, is a different story: the 
data show that a staggering 18 percent of all projects are “expensive” outliers (that is, 
projects with cost overruns above 25 percent).  
 
Histogram of Cost Risk 
 
18% of all ICT projects are Black Swans 
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We call these expensive outliers “black swans,” after Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
in his 2007 book “The Black Swan.” Taleb defines black swans as rare, high-impact 
events that seem improbable and unforeseeable but, in hindsight, are explainable. In 
our sample we found a 4,957 percent over-incidence of black swans.   
From this perspective starting an IT project is similar to playing Russian Roulette. 
From 6 projects proposals that ask for funding on your desk, 1 is going to run out of 
control so badly that it might not only bring government services to a halt, but can 
cause major economic damage, and end your career. 
Black swans have high cost, schedule and benefit risks, 
which are hidden in the fat tails of ICT portfolios 
Risk comparison, Median, in percent  
▪  Even if the median cost overrun is low, risk of cost overruns is high 
▪  Black Swans mean very high cost and schedule risks  
▪  And all the projects with a downside risk show significant risk 
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This disproportionate number of black swans represents very high risks for 
public sector organizations. The typical IT project in our sample had 0 percent cost 
overruns and took an unremarkable 24 percent longer to implement than initially 
expected. When you green-light a project today the likelihood of this happening are 
31%. These are not the jaw-dropping, triple-digit overruns often associated with large 
government IT projects. There is, however, a 28% chance that a project overruns the 
budget, then a reasonable expectation is that the project needs 47% more budget and 
38% more time than initially expected.  
 
But what really matters are the Black Swans. The data shows that with a 
probability of 18% the project is going to spin out of control and a typical Black Swan 
overruns its cost by 130 percent in real terms and falls 41 percent behind schedule. 
 
Our research also uncovered another class of black swans, albeit a very 
different species. We found that in the last four years half of all public sector IT 
projects has suffered an average budget cut of 75 percent. These “starved projects,” 
shown in the light-gray area in Exhibit 2, are also a public management challenge. 
Public sector leaders must prepare robust answers to the question, “What will we do if 
half our ongoing IT projects get their budgets cut by as much as 75 percent?”  
 
When it comes to assessing risk in public sector IT projects, therefore, simple 
averages don’t matter much. What matters are the black swans—the one in six 
projects that could go terribly wrong. In light of the enormous risks, managing black 
swans can only be the responsibility of top management, not just IT leadership. A 
crucial question for top management becomes, “What will our organization do in the 
event that every sixth large IT project we undertake goes over budget by 130 percent 
and takes 40 percent longer than scheduled?”   
 
Apart from bracing for impact, what can a public sector organization do?  We 
believe it is 4 things that count 
1. Benchmark your organization to know where you are 
2. De-bias your IT project decision-making 
3. Reduce the complexities of your IT projects 
4. Develop Masterbuilders – learn from the best in the field 
 
First, we find that for most organizations the starting point and the most valuable 
knowledge comes from simply understanding where they stand. Very often, we find, 
organisations lack a reliable view of how the organisation’s projects perform. A very 
first step is to establish a system of reporting that enables impactful decision-making: 
spot things early, surface issues quickly, act on them decisively Moreover, a powerful 
benchmark compares not only your project risks (incl. the risk of projects turning into 
a Black Swan) internally but also with other public and private sector organizations.  
Exhibit 4 shows a starting point how decision-makers can break down and better 
understand the risk faced by their organization. Our data shows, for example, that 
standard software projects, despite their perceived ease of implementation face the 
highest risk of turning into Black Swans. The data also shows that Big Data and office 
automation projects are particularly risky. How does your organization’s risk 
compare? 
Despite perceived ease of implementation standard software 
projects have highest risk of turning into a Black Swan 
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Secondly, once you have understood and measured the risks in your 
organization you can turn this knowledge into better decisions. The Nobel laureate 
Daniel Kahneman and his colleague Amos Tversky discovered that decisions can be 
de-biased by taking the outside view. Simply by asking the question: How did the last 
10 IT projects do that tried to do the same as the planned one? What does this say 
about the likelihood of success or failure for the planned project? 
 
Also ask whether there were tell-tale signs that either a project was running 
smoothly or got into trouble. Our data shows, for instance, that projects that are 
described as unique by people involved in them have a 3-times higher propensity of 
turning into Black Swans. If project uniqueness is a common claim in your 
organization, be aware! 
 
Thirdly, to mitigate the risks that Black Swans pose, public sector 
organizations must reduce the complexity of their IT projects. Our data shows quite 
clearly that the longer the project the higher the risk (Exhibit 5). Every additional year 
of project duration increases the average cost risk by 4.2 percentage points. Long 
projects are also more likely to turn into a Black Swan.  Reducing the project 
complexity, for instance by introducing modularity, helps improving IT project risks. 
 
Post-mortem analysis indicates higher risk for longer 
projects – large Black Swan population for projects with 
durations of more than 24 months 
Cost overrun 
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Actual project duration 
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▪  Every additional year increases the 
expected cost overrun by 4.2 
percentage points and schedule 
overrun by 1.2 pp 
▪  For the average MIS project (typically 
63m USD, 3 years) every year project 
duration adds 3m USD risk  
 
Lastly, learn from the best in the field. Learn from, what we call Master 
Builders. Our observations show that in every organization and in every industry there 
are project managers who are able to deliver on-time and on-budget time and time 
again. Finding your Masterbuilders, uncovering their practices of how to avoid Black 
Swans might seem the most difficult task but it will be the best defence of your 
organization and your career against a disastrous Black Swan. 
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